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Abstract
In this paper, standard SVAR tools and counterfactual simulation techniques are applied
to study the behavior and countercyclical role of monetary and ￿scal policies in the US. In
order to set up the model properly, di⁄erent issues raised by joint identi￿cation of monetary
and ￿scal policy shocks are addressed, in particular, the contemporaneous response of taxes
to the federal funds rate.
I conclude that the federal funds rate and taxes net of transfers have moved mostly for
endogenous reasons and, in the latter case, this re￿ ects automatic rather than discretionary
policy. In contrast, government expenditure has been basically driven by exogenous forces.
Further, I reach evidence that (automatic) ￿scal policy has been the most important stabi-
lizing force in the course of postwar recessions, surpassing the role of monetary policy, while
both policies have contributed similarly to narrowing the output gap at early stages of the
recovery.
JEL: E63, C32
Keywords: ￿scal policy, monetary policy, stabilization, structural vector autoregression
1 Introduction
The goal of the work presented here is to gather evidence about the behavior and stabilizing
e⁄ects of ￿scal and monetary policies over the last decades in the US. This is done, ￿rstly,
by constructing an identi￿ed VAR in which both policies are considered in conjunction, and
then by applying counterfactual simulation techniques, in the spirit of Sims and Zha (1998) and
￿Comments from Artur Silva Lopes and Lu￿s Costa are gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are
mine.
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1Bernanke et al. (1997), to estimate the endogenous and exogenous components of the change in
policy variables and their impact on GDP during contractionary periods.
There are a few examples of studies dealing with joint identi￿cation and the e⁄ects of mon-
etary and ￿scal policy innovations using SVARs, such as Perotti (2002) and Canzoneri et al.
(2002), that appeared in the wake of well know literature considering each policy in isolation (as
in Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Christiano et al. (1999) and Blanchard and Perotti (2002)).
Nevertheless, the most prominent simultaneity issue arising when both policies are taken to-
gether - the co-movement between taxes and the monetary policy instrument, the federal funds
rate - has not received much attention before. In order to model this appropriately, I argue, one
has to allow a contemporaneous nonzero elasticity of taxes to the short-term interest rate. Other
simultaneity issues to be taken into account are the contemporaneous relationship between ￿scal
and monetary policy variables and the business cycle and in￿ ation. A general remark about the
approach followed in this paper is that I take it as given that policies (endogenous and exoge-
nous) have real e⁄ects and attempt to estimate them (this is a stand similar, for instance, to that
taken in Romer and Romer (1994)). Also as preliminary point, I address in Section 2 the ability
of identi￿ed VARs to estimate the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy on GDP, which has been forcefully
questioned (see Ramey (2008)) on the grounds that SVAR ￿scal disturbances are anticipated by
agents.
The system I consider throughout the paper has ￿ve equations: three of them are structural
- a monetary policy rule and equations for government revenue and expenditure, the latter cap-
turing both the reaction function of ￿scal authorities and automatic responses to macroeconomic
variables. There are two additional equations which are solved out versions, respectively, for
GDP and in￿ ation, of standard aggregated supply and IS curves. The disturbances in these last
equations do not have, contrary to the policy disturbances, a structural interpretation (that is, I
do not disentangle aggregate supply and private aggregate demand innovations). This system is
described in Section 3 and is a textbook-like macroeconomic system (such as those presented in
Walsh (2003, ch. 5)) in which monetary policy is set through interest-rate targeting. According
to the objective of the analysis, however, I single out the ￿scal role as well. This approach has
common points with that of Blanchard and Watson (1984), one of the earliest contributions
to the SVAR literature, but they used money supply and a single ￿scal index as the policy
instruments, and identi￿ed the non-policy innovations.
Some of the contemporaneous coe¢ cients in the equations for the ￿scal variables are cal-
ibrated using non-sample information following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). This requires
that I generalize the OECD method to derive of the elasticity of personal income taxes to GDP
that they use, in order to encompass the semi-elasticities to in￿ ation and the short-term interest
rate. This is done in Section 4 and Appendix A, where I also consider whether it is feasible
2to compute such semi-elasticities on the basis of the information available, and the calculation
of the corresponding parameters for the other kinds of taxes and transfers. Section 5 describes
the identi￿cation and estimation of the system which depends in particular on the assumptions
made about the ordering of the monetary policy instrument and the non-policy variables, GDP
and prices.
I present a ￿rst set of empirical results in Section 6 using standard SVAR tools. The impacts
on GDP are broadly similar to those in previous studies considering each policy in isolation but,
as far as ￿scal policy is concerned, they indicate less e⁄ectiveness in stimulating activity on the
side of taxes and transfers. There is evidence that this is basically accounted for by subsample
sensitivity, which is a marked feature of the results, rather than by controlling for the short-
term interest rate and prices. Further, I conclude that the changes in the federal funds rate and
taxes are dominated by the respective systematic components, re￿ ecting discretionary actions
in the ￿rst case and, I argue, automatic movements in the second. The endogenous component
is, by contrast, much less important for government expenditure. One also gets evidence that
the short-term feedback between the two sides of the budget is weaker than normally thought.
Finally, in the same vein as the monetary policy VARs literature, I conclude that neither of the
policy disturbances are the primary source of business cycle ￿ uctuations.
Section 7 presents a decomposition of the changes in the policy variables into an endogenous
and an exogenous part, for each of the eight business cycle contractions since the beginning of
my sample (1955), as dated by the NBER. In order to do this, I compare the historical behavior
of the variables with the implied behavior when the system is simulated under counterfactual
assumptions. In addition, the output gain brought about by the endogenous and exogenous
components is measured at the trough of the recession and two quarters afterwards. In general,
one concludes that the automatic stabilizers built in taxes and transfers have been the most
important force attenuating the severity of recessions. Their contribution continues to be rele-
vant to enhance growth in the initial quarters after the trough but, at that point, on an equal
footing with systematic monetary policy. Discretionary ￿scal policy, on both sides of the budget,
appears to have been of secondary importance.
2 On the meaning of ￿scal policy shocks and the ability of
SVARs to capture them
A correct measurement of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in an SVAR context requires, in the ￿rst
place, that the shocks are exogenous in relation to the variable, say GDP, on which the impact
is being determined. Meaning that the portion of the ￿scal variables labelled as the «shock»
must not respond to GDP nor, more generally, to variables correlated with it. Perhaps the most
3obvious candidates in this respect are interest rates and prices. As a ￿rst point, it is important to
ascertain whether there are ￿scal policy actions meeting such requirements in practice. Romer
and Romer (2007) investigated the legislated tax changes in the US since World War II and
found four types of motivations behind them: to react to the business cycle, to ￿nance changes
in spending, to raise long-run growth and to cope with an inherited de￿cit (which could be
also stated as to cope with growing debt). The Romers classify the last two as exogenous with
respect to output ￿ uctuations,1 and show that they have been clearly more prevalent than their
endogenous counterparts throughout the postwar period. Turning to budget outlays, examples of
exogenous, or at least party exogenous, interventions are also not di¢ cult to ￿nd. These include
the build-ups in defense spending on which the so-called «event study» literature has focused,2
as well as the creation and extension of certain social programs largely unrelated to the business
cycle (like Medicaid). Another ￿scal intervention concerns the normally annual decision about
across-the-board adjustments to the pay of government employees. Such adjustments are partly
endogenous to past in￿ ation to the extent that they make up for it (adding to the other increases
in pay related to the advancement of employees), but they are also determined by exogenous
policy goals as, for instance, expenditure restraint or achieving wage rates comparable with
those in the private sector. The last kind of goals can be very important in practice. This can
be seen by analyzing the pay adjustments in the General Schedule which covers most Federal
government civilian employees, in the years spanning since mid-￿fties.3 Until the beginning
of the seventies, a time when the comparability principle ranked high on the political agenda
(see Smith (1982)), the cumulative increase stood over 70 p.p. above the variation in the CPI.
By contrast, during the high in￿ ation period from 1973 to 1981 that followed, pay updates fell
systematically short of the rise in prices (more than 50 p.p. below, in cumulative terms). Since
1982 the adjustments have been more in line with in￿ ation (negative di⁄erence of 19 p.p. in
relation to the CPI from 1983 to 2005). Changes in social transfers and purchases of goods and
services undertaken in response to business cycle conditions have been infrequent and small over
the last decades (Romer and Romer (1994)). Hence, contrary to monetary policy for which the
existence of exogenous interventions has been a matter of debate, in the case of ￿scal policy
1As the Romers recognize, tax changes to cope with growing debt may have some degree of endogeneity with
GDP, if they are accompanied by similar measures on the expenditure side (note that the same applies if debt as
such has a systematic e⁄ect on GDP).
2Although it is legitimate to consider separately the e⁄ects of military episodes, given the added claim to
exogeneity, it is often thought that shocks to purchases of goods and services relate only to defense contracts.
To put things in perspective, purchases related to defense (as measured by NIPAs) are about 1/3 of the total
and, excluding compensation of employees from the aggregate, about 40 per cent. In terms of the contribution
to the overall variance (series in real and per capita terms, sample 1955:1-2005:4) the defense component has a
coe¢ cient of variation of 0.13, much smaller than the one of non-defense expenditure which is 0.36.
3The Federal Civilian Workforce Statistics (US O¢ ce of Personnel Management) present a chronology of the
General Schedule Pay Legislation since 1945.
4many actions fall within this category, even if identi￿cation assumptions are generally needed
to isolate them.
A second requirement for a correct measurement of the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy is that the
timing of the shocks corresponds to the moment in which they actually impacted economic
activity. If ￿scal shocks, albeit exogenous, can be anticipated by agents and if agents modify
their behavior accordingly, identi￿ed VARs will still not estimate properly their e⁄ects on GDP.
This issue is clearly of potential importance in the case of ￿scal policy because changes to taxes
and spending typically have to go through a legislative process, and thus agents get information
about them about them ahead of the implementation. The problem was already recognized in
the early SVAR papers on the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)). Recent
contributions to the event study literature (Ramey (2008) and previous work in the same vein)
argued forcefully that the anticipation e⁄ects are likely to invalidate inferences relating to ￿scal
policy drawn from SVARs. As it is known, the event study approach focus on the impact of
increases in defense spending in the wake of the major postwar military episodes, and dates the
shocks when the news about the likely rise in defense spending ￿rst came up in the media. Since
I employ the SVAR methodology, it is appropriate to put forward some considerations about
how serious the issue of anticipation may be.
Note, to start with, that neither the SVAR nor the event study approach present evidence
as to the importance of anticipation e⁄ects. In order to get it, one has to turn to micro studies
addressing the actual behavior of agents in face of information about pending ￿scal shocks.
There is a large body of empirical evidence about the way households react to changes in
taxes (also some about the reaction to changes in social bene￿ts and, in any case, one might
expect that the same type of behavior applies in this case). This has been gathered by the
literature documenting the so-called «natural tax experiments» (see Johnston et al. (2006) and
the references they cite), and provides support to the hypothesis that tax changes do a⁄ect
households￿behavior at the time revenue is collected. For instance, predictable tax liabilities
and refunds have signi￿cant contemporaneous impacts on consumption. It is illustrative, in
this respect, that although Romer and Romer (2007) follow a methodology akin to the event
study approach, they date «their» tax shocks according to when the legislated changes impacted
revenue (note that the narrative sources they use have information about alternative dates e.g.
the time when tax bills were signed). In the same vein, one can assume that households do not
smooth consumption in anticipation of changes in disposable income resulting from shocks to
compensation of government employees.
No comparable micro evidence as to the behavior of ￿rms in face of information about
pending ￿scal changes is (to the best of my knowledge) available. The relevant budget items in
this respect are, on the receipt side, taxes on pro￿ts and part of social security contributions and,
5on the outlay side, intermediate consumption and investment. The event study approach has
chie￿ y raised the anticipation issue in relation to military component of these last items. I note
that the timing of shocks followed by that approach is not undisputable. Indeed, considerable
uncertainty remains at the point the news about the likely military build-up ￿rst come up,
for instance, as to its actual size, the weapon systems government will purchase, who among
competing contractors will be chosen as the supplier, and so on. Thus, it may well be that the
relevant timing is when contracts are awarded. It is not unreasonable to think that anticipation
matters more for the ￿nancial markets, which react to news (see Wachtel and Young (1987) and
related literature on the impact of ￿scal news on interest rates) than for the labor and product
markets.
An issue that admittedly may disturb the measurement of ￿scal shocks is raised by the way
purchases of durable goods are recorded in NIPAs. NIPAs mostly record such purchases on a
cash disbursements basis (see BEA (2005) and the discussion in Perotti (2004)) while the full
amount of the acquisition (known by the supplier from the moment the contract is signed) is
likely to be the relevant fact from the private sector￿ s viewpoint. Thus National Accounts will
typically record an initial payment which does not re￿ ect the full size of the «true» shock. Still,
an important part of purchases of goods and services is not a⁄ected by the issue.
3 The equations in the system and identifying restrictions
3.1 General characterization
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Purchases of goods and services (including of capital goods) are denoted by gt, taxes net of
transfers by ntt, the federal funds rate by fft, detrended GDP (i.e. the output gap) by yt and
in￿ ation by pt. The ￿scal variables and output are the logarithms of the levels measured in real
and per capita terms. In￿ ation is calculated from the GDP de￿ ator and, like the federal funds
rate, is measured at annual rates. I give more details about the de￿nition of the ￿scal variables
and sources in Appendix C. Throughout the paper, ntt is also sometimes called simply «taxes» ,
and gt «expenditure» or «spending» . The vector xt includes the variables in the system:





t ) are ortogonal to each
other and also to w1t and w2t, while these two innovations will be in general correlated. As usual
in the SVAR methodology, the identi￿cation restrictions are imposed on the contemporaneous
coe¢ cients (the a0￿ s), while the lag structure of the model (the a￿ s) is left unrestricted. The
system is estimated with quarterly data and the lag length is set to 4. I did not include
deterministic terms in equations (1) to (5): the discussion of the assumptions about the low-
frequency properties of the data is deferred to a separate subsection below.
The ￿rst two equations above are those for government expenditure and net taxes.4 If one
assumes, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), that any government reaction to macroeco-
nomic conditions takes more than one quarter to be implemented, the a0￿ s in (1) and (2) can
be interpreted as the automatic contemporaneous response of the ￿scal variables to macroeco-
nomic conditions. Such a response may be brought about, in particular, by mechanisms built
in the tax code, transfer programs and budgeting procedures. Since the ￿scal variables are in
real terms, de￿ ated by the GDP de￿ ator, this also induces a contemporaneous co-movement of
gt and ntt with pt (these points are detailed in the discussion of the calibration of the para-




0 will capture the automatic responses of net taxes to
activity and prices within the quarter, and a
g;p
0 of government spending to prices. It appears
relatively undisputable that spending does not react to contemporaneous movements in activity,
and therefore current GDP is absent from equation (1). Turning to the semi-elasticity of taxes
to the short-term interest rate, can a
nt;ff
0 be set to zero? I argue it cannot. This point deserves
special attention since it lies at the very heart of the joint identi￿cation of monetary and ￿scal
policy, and has hardly been dealt with by the literature. It is therefore addressed separately in a
moment. As to the corresponding parameter in the expenditure equation, a
g;ff
0 , one expects it
to be indeed equal to zero, since there is no obvious mechanism linking purchases of goods and
4To consider each side of the budget separately, rather than the de￿cit, allows us to investigate potential
di⁄erentiated behavior and impacts. The de￿nition of revenue as taxes net of transfers, and of expenditure as
purchases of goods and services, assumes implicitly that their impact operates through the standard aggregate
demand channel. Such de￿nitions have also the practical advantage of lumping together in the revenue variable
the budget categories sensitive to the business cycle.
7services and interest rates within the quarter. However, as shown in the section devoted to the
identi￿cation of the system, once a
nt;ff
0 6= 0, the estimation of a
g;ff
0 comes at no additional cost.
Hence I estimate this coe¢ cient rather than impose a zero restriction, in order to have exact
identi￿cation of the parameters in the ￿scal and monetary policy equations, and complete ortog-
onality of the respective structural disturbances. Note further that I allow either the structural
innovation to net taxes to enter the equation for gt, or the structural innovation to expenditure
to enter the equation for ntt (borrowing from Blanchard and Perotti). It makes sense to do so
because when setting ￿scal policy, government observes and takes into consideration both sides




0 ) requires that one of
them is set to zero or, equivalently, that net taxes and spending are ordered one after the other.
Given that such an identi￿cation restriction is arbitrary, the results have to be checked under
both possibilities.
The coe¢ cients in ag and ant will re￿ ect any systematic response of government to macro-
economic developments - the ￿scal policy rule, the lagged automatic reaction to the economy,
and the persistence in budget variables brought about by the way ￿scal policy is set (since the
government budget and tax laws are not designed from scratch each year).5 Non-systematic
policy is captured by the structural ￿scal shocks (e
g
t and ent
t ) whose e⁄ects one endeavours to
trace using the SVAR methodology.
Since equations (1) and (2) are supposed to capture ￿scal policy rules, the following remark is
in order. Some literature on this issue for the US (e.g. Bohn (1998)) argued that ￿scal authorities
have acted according to a government debt stabilization motive besides an output stabilization
one. The cited work by Romer and Romer (2007) includes the correction of inherited de￿cits,
which could be equally stated as concern over growing debt, among the motives for legislated
tax changes. Examples changes in outlays undertaken for the same reasons could be pointed
out as well. Since lags of net taxes and expenditure enter all equations, the possibility that
￿scal authorities react to very recent imbalances is covered. But it might be the debt level that
matters, and such indicator is missing. The empirical evidence that government debt enters
signi￿cantly the ￿scal equations is, however, weak. For this reason, debt was not taken on
board in the system. Indeed, in order to examine the issue, I estimated the system in the
reduced-form, with lags of the variables in xt and the lagged debt to GDP ratio as regressors. I
experimented with lags 1 to 4 of debt, each in turn, since it is the level of the variable that is
supposed to matter. On the basis of the reference sample, 1955:1-2005:4, the additional regressor
5Here it is interesting to draw a parallel with monetary policy rules based on interest rate targeting, in which
the Federal Reserve is, in principle, freer to set the interest rate at a given level. Nevertheless, the literature has
assumed that the Fed smooths the changes in interest rates, implying that the rule includes lags of the policy
variable (see, for instance, Clarida et al. (2000)). In the case of ￿scal policy there are even more reasons to follow
such a speci￿cation.
8was not signi￿cant at any reasonable level (though the coe¢ cient signs were the expected ones,
that is, negative in the expenditure equation and positive in the revenue equation). An open
possibility that I did not explore is that the ￿scal variables do respond to government debt but
in an nonlinear fashion. Looking at the chart depicting net taxes and expenditure over time
(Figure 1 below) one sees that the budget imbalances sometimes lasted several years in a row.
Thus corrective action may be triggered only upon the cumulative imbalance reaching a certain
threshold.
Equation (3) is the monetary policy rule that builds on well known literature showing that
(i) the federal funds rate provides a good measure of the monetary policy instrument, and (ii)
the rule can be modelled as the federal funds rate responding to output gap and to the deviation
of in￿ ation from a target (see e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Taylor (1993) and Christiano
et al. (1999)). In this context it is common to assume that monetary authorities observe the
developments in activity and in￿ ation and react accordingly within the quarter, whereas GDP
and in￿ ation are slow-moving variables that respond with a certain delay to changes in the




0 = 0. However, as this assumption is
more compelling with monthly data, and also because I do allow a contemporaneous reaction





0 = 0 are considered as well. A systematic response of monetary authorities
to contemporaneous ￿scal developments is ruled out, that is, the current values of government
budget variables do not enter the monetary policy rule. As it is well known, monetary policy
VARs usually include a commodity price indicator in order to eliminate the so-called «price
puzzle» . I deviated from this practice because, anticipating results, the puzzle I get is not
as dramatic as the one reported in Christiano et al. (1999), in that the punctual response of
in￿ ation does become negative some quarters after the shock. Moreover, the focus here is not
on the e⁄ects of monetary policy in general, but a narrower one concentrating on activity.
Considering ￿nally equations (4) and (5), they are solved-out versions for yt and pt of an IS
and an aggregate supply curves, as described next. I assume that the current ￿scal variables
enter the aggregate demand schedule while, depending on the ordering assumptions made in
the monetary policy rule above, the current short-term interest rate may be or not part of
it. Contemporaneous in￿ ation is allowed to enter the aggregate demand schedule, in order to
account for the e⁄ects of this variable on spending intentions. I assume a simple aggregate supply
schedule linking current GDP and prices. Under these conditions, the two relationships can be
6There is also an empirical reason for so doing. As Christiano et al. (1999) note, there is a positive correlation
between the reduced-form residuals of the GDP and federal funds rate equations (that also shows up in our results
- see Table B1 in Appendix B). If one rules out that this e⁄ect is brought about by the behavior of monetary
authorities, then one has to explain the awkward result that a tightening in monetary policy causes a positive
reaction on GDP.
9solved out for yt and pt yielding (4) and (5).7 The disturbances w1t and w2t will be a function
of the underlying structural private aggregate spending and aggregate supply innovations, and
thus mutually correlated. Moreover the same policy variables will enter each of the equations
(4) and (5).
3.2 The semi-elasticity of net taxes to the short-term rate
I address ￿rst a preliminary issue concerning the de￿nition of net taxes which has a direct
implication for the way this variable responds to the interest rate. Net taxes are equal to taxes
minus transfers and the latter can be computed either including or excluding interest paid (there
are examples of both treatments in the literature). The ￿rst de￿nition implicitly assumes that
the ￿scal structural shocks originate in the full budget, and the second one that they originate in
the primary budget. I argue that the latter is the appropriate de￿nition. SVARs are supposed
to identify and trace the e⁄ects of discretionary non-systematic ￿scal policy. However, the direct
determinants of interest outlays are the interest rates and the stock of debt and not (except in
very particular cases) discretionary ￿scal policy actions. In other words, the structural ￿scal
innovations do not enter an equation (actually, rather an identity) explaining government interest
outlays. From the point of view of empirical work, sticking to the primary budget implies that
the econometrician has to deal with only one channel through which the unexpected movements
in interest rates may impact movements in net taxes - the tax base - ruling out an additional
impact via the interest bill. Thus the precise issue is whether a
nt;ff
0 can be set to zero, when
net taxes are de￿ned without considering interest paid, as in this paper.
Note that the correlation between the residuals of the reduced-form equations for ntt and fft,
shown in Table B1, is around 0.33 and thus quite high (in contrast, the corresponding correlation
between the residuals of fft and gt equations is close to zero). Naturally that correlation is partly
caused by a common response of the two variables to the business cycle, ntt re￿ ecting the action
of the automatic stabilizers, fft due to the action of the Federal Reserve (and a similar argument
applies to in￿ ation). Therefore, it is important to see whether it remains after this latter e⁄ect





from a previous study, Perotti (2002) (I will recompute these ￿gures in Appendix A). The
corresponding correlation taking now the reduced-form residuals for the ntt equation adjusted
for unexpected movements in GDP and prices8 is 0.26. This indicates a contemporaneous
link between net taxes and the short-term interest rate going beyond simultaneity with third
7Let the contemporaneous part of aggregate demand, when fft enters it, be given by yt = ￿1gt + ￿2ntt +
￿3fft + ￿4pt + "
d
t and aggregate supply by yt = ￿1pt + "
s





Equation (4) obtains solving out this system for yt and (5) solving it out for pt.
8That is, the correlation between ^ u
ff
t and ^ u
nt￿
t = ^ u
nt
t ￿ 2:1^ u
y
t ￿ 0:275^ u
p
t, where the ^ ut￿ s are the reduced-form
residuals of the respective equations.
10variables. The researcher must come to terms with the causality underlying it. I argue that
it re￿ ects the response of net taxes within the quarter, namely of personal income taxes, to
movements in the short-term interest rate. If this is the case, then the tax base related to
personal income on assets should react to the contemporaneous funds rate. There is evidence
that it does.9 Note that the opposite causality would imply that monetary policy responded
systematically to ￿scal variables during the sample period, which is usually considered not to
have taken place. Finally, the negligible correlation between the reduced-form residuals of fft
and gt equations points in the same direction. Christiano et al. (1996), working with ￿ ow of
funds data, reported an initial contraction of government borrowing following a tightening in
monetary policy, which they attributed to an ensuing rise in personal income tax collection. The
same phenomenon is disclosed here.
3.3 Assumptions regarding the low-frequency properties of the data
Although the analysis in this paper is con￿ned to the short-term e⁄ects of policies and does
not rely on long-run identi￿cation restrictions, the sample spans over 50 years and, hence,
some discussion of the assumptions about the low-frequency properties of the data is in order.
There is no point in entering here the debate about unit root behavior versus stationarity
around a deterministic linear trend of GDP for the US. In addition, none of those hypotheses
accommodates the observed decline in the long-run GDP growth over the last decades (as noted
by Blanchard (1989)). Note that the evolution of the ￿scal variables throughout the sample
(Figure 1) is also well characterized by a decreasing long-run growth rate. Therefore, in the
benchmark speci￿cation I formalize the trends in GDP and budget variables as deterministic,
but allow for a quadratic term in order to capture the change in average growth over time. This
speci￿cation was used in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) and is also one of the measures of the
output gap considered by Clarida et al. (2000) in the estimation of a monetary policy rule for
the US. Nevertheless, in the empirical part, I discuss brie￿ y how the results change when no
trend, only a constant, enters the equations for those variables, which may be seen as covering
the stochastic (and constant) growth alternative. To foreshadow, this matters mostly as far as
the persistence of responses is concerned. Reference will be made in due course to yet another
low-frequency speci￿cation: cointegration between the revenue and expenditure variables. As
9Speci￿cally, the tax base of the personal income tax, excluding labor income, was approximated using NIPAs
data (see Appendix C). In order to estimate a semi-elasticity to the funds rate, the change in the log personal
income on assets (per capita) was regressed on lags 0 to 4 of the change in the funds rate and lags 1 to 4 of
the change in in￿ ation and change in log GDP (sample 1955:1-2005:4). The coe¢ cient for the contemporaneous
semi-elasticity to the funds rate is highly signi￿cant (^ t = 5:1). However, this regression is very likely to have
simultaneity problems to the extent that the dependent variable and the current funds rate are correlated with
GDP. We ran the same regression but using lagged changes in the funds rate as an instrument; the coe¢ cient
remains signi￿cant (^ t = 2:4).
11Expenditure and net taxes (dashed)
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Figure 1: Macroeconomic variables, 1955:1-2005:4, and NBER recession dates
the system also includes an interest rate and in￿ ation for which it does not make sense to assume
a trending behavior, the deterministic trends in GDP and ￿scal variables are removed by OLS
regression prior to estimation of the system (in the benchmark speci￿cation).
If the time-series properties of GDP are controversial, those of the short-term interest rate
and in￿ ation are hardly less. Stationarity of both series follows from a great deal of theoreti-
cal models that rationalize the use of monetary policy rules. Visual inspection of the respective
charts in Figure 1, however, indicates a long-run path di¢ cult to square with stationarity around
a single long-run mean - a driftless random walk appearing more appropriate. However, alter-
native stationary characterizations would be equally plausible, such as around a long-run mean
with an upward shift in the period from mid-seventies to mid-eighties. This assumption could
be rationalized as a temporary increase in expected in￿ ation implicit in the monetary policy
rule, brought about by the in￿ ationary process in the seventies. Nevertheless, as it would have
12some degree of arbitrariness - in particular, as to the moment of the upward shift in the mean -
a more conventional speci￿cation was chosen, including only a constant in the interest rate and
in￿ ation equations.
4 Calibration of elasticities of the government budget items
Before one looks into the identi￿cation and estimation of the system, it is appropriate to consider
the possibility of calibrating some of the parameters in the net tax and expenditure equations
on the basis of institutional information, following Blanchard and Perotti (2002). They relied
on the framework developed by the OECD (Giorno et al. (1995), updated in van den Noord
(2000) and Girouard and AndrØ (2005)) to compute the elasticity of personal income taxes
to GDP. In Appendix A, I extend this by deriving analytical expressions for the elasticity of
personal income taxes to prices and the semi-elasticity to the short-term interest rate. As
discussed there, however, this latter parameter cannot be calibrated on the basis of the data
made available by the OECD and remaining assumptions. I give in the appendix, in addition,
the details underlying the calculation of the elasticities of the remaining taxes and transfers to







information, but not a
nt;ff
0 which has to be estimated along with the other elements of the
matrix of the contemporaneous coe¢ cients.
Note that Perotti (2002) studied the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in a system with the interest rate
and prices, but imposing a zero semi-elasticity of net taxes to the sort-term interest rate (and
also using assumptions di⁄erent from the ones here in order to derive the responses to prices).
This simpli￿es the identi￿cation task but, as seen, is not adequate in the US context (Perotti￿ s
study deals with a group of OECD countries, not speci￿cally with the US).10
5 Identi￿cation and estimation
It is useful to write down the matrices with the contemporaneous structural coe¢ cients, denoted
by A0 and B0, in order to highlight the identi￿cation and estimation issues to be tackled. These
matrices are
10Canzoneri et al. (2002) also consider a system with the federal funds rate and prices, but concentrated on
modelling the impact of the short-term rate on government interest outlays. The de￿nition of variables adopted
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0 = 0, and either b
nt;g
0 = 0 or b
g;nt
0 = 0.
There are 15 independent moments in the covariance matrix of the reduced-form system.
Excluding the information needed to obtain the 5 standard deviations of the disturbances and the
covariance the reduced-form residuals of the equations for pt and yt (which has information about
the contemporaneous relationship between these two variables that I do not attempt to identify),
one is left with 9 usable moments. Given the restrictions I impose on the contemporaneous






0 on the basis of non-sample
information, there are equally 9 parameters to estimate. Therefore, the order condition is
ful￿lled. This is only a necessary condition though, and the identi￿cation and estimation details
depend on the assumptions made about the contemporaneous relationship between the short-
term interest rate, activity and prices, as explained next (assuming that b
g;nt
0 = 0; the converse
case b
nt;g
0 = 0 requires only minor modi￿cations).




0 = 0. With
the calibrated elasticities to GDP and prices in hand, one can compute the net taxes and
expenditure series adjusted for the contemporaneous movements in GDP and prices, denoted by
nt￿




0 pt and g￿
t = gt￿^ a
g;p
0 pt. Since fft is predetermined with respect to all the
other variables in the system, equation (1) can be simply estimated by OLS regression of g￿
t on
fft and lagged endogenous variables, yielding in addition ^ e
g
t. Estimation of equation (2) follows
by OLS regression of nt￿
t on fft, ^ e
g
t and lagged endogenous variables. The equations for yt and pt
are then estimated by instrumental variables using g￿
t and nt￿
t (or ^ e
g
t and ^ ent
t ) as instruments for
ntt and gt, and fft and the lagged endogenous variables as instruments for themselves. Finally,
equation (3) can be estimated directly by OLS. I carry out one-step estimation of the system
rather than the usual one in two steps in which the reduced form is estimated ￿rst and then
A0 and B0 on the basis of the respective residuals. In fact, since the calibrated parameters
vary over time, the two methods do not yield exactly the same results and one-step estimation
appears slightly more correct.11
11The reduced form with constant coe¢ cients estimated in the ￿rst step is not fully consistent with a structural
form in which some parameters vary. Note that the calibrated parameters are time-varying because so are the




0 = 0, i.e. when
contemporaneous prices and output enter the equation for the federal funds rate. In this case,
since fft is not ortogonal to e
g
t and ent
t , OLS estimation of the ￿scal equations is not possible.
Standard estimation of the system by maximum likelihood is, however, feasible. In this case
the information about the calibrated parameters is incorporated as known entries of A0 and
B0 (average values over the sample, so in this case it is not possible to allow time-variation).
I searched over reasonable initial values for the parameters in order to build con￿dence on the
maximum likelihood estimates, as far as global identi￿cation was concerned.
6 Dynamic e⁄ects of structural policy shocks
This section presents a ￿rst set of conclusions about the dynamic e⁄ects of ￿scal policy and
monetary policy innovations, with the aid of the customary tools in an SVAR context, namely,
impulse responses and variance decompositions. I recall that the system was estimated with
quarterly data, which were seasonally adjusted (except for the funds rate) at source. Government
expenditure, net taxes and GDP are in real and per capita terms and in loglevels (see Appendix C
for more on the variables and sources). In￿ ation is measured as the change in log GDP de￿ ator.
Both in￿ ation and the federal funds rate are annualized. The full sample covers 1955:1-2005:4.
6.1 Contemporaneous impacts and impulse-responses
Table B2 in Appendix B gives the estimates of the contemporaneous coe¢ cients, under the two
alternative schemes above as to the ordering of the federal funds rate versus GDP and in￿ ation.
Given the length of the sample, it is appropriate to present some evidence regarding subsample
sensitivity. Thus I show also those estimates for two subsamples, 1955:1-1979:4 and 1980:1-2005:4
- the breakpoint was chosen as the midpoint. Figure 2 depicts the impulse-responses to positive
one-standard deviation shocks (corresponding to about 0.8 p.p. in the case of the interest rate
and, respectively, 2.4 and 1.2 percent in the case of net taxes and expenditure).12 They are for
the case in which the macroeconomic variables are ordered before the short-term interest rate,
benchmark speci￿cation of trends and full sample. I signal in the text how results change when
one deviates from those assumptions or restricts the estimation period to the subsamples. In
elasticities of the average tax rate to the wage, for personal income taxes and social security contributions, and
the weights of the di⁄erent taxes and transfers in the total.
12I present the average response and one-standard error bands, computed by Monte Carlo simulation (as
described in Estima (2007)) on the basis of 1000 replications. The responses are measured as a percentage of
the variable for GDP, net taxes and expenditure, and in percentage points (annualized) for the interest rate and
in￿ ation.
15Impulse: federal funds rate Impulse: Net taxes Impulse: Expenditure
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Figure 2: Responses to ￿scal and monetary policy shocks
what follows one concentrates mostly on aspects that are new or diverge from the conclusions
reached by the work considering each policy in isolation.
Controlling for one policy when measuring the e⁄ects of the other (and, in addition, con-
trolling for prices when measuring the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy) should provide a more accurate
measure of the impacts. For instance, if the funds rate is omitted from equation (2), net tax
shocks will partly capture the movements in this variable, and their (negative) measured impact
on GDP is likely to be overstated for this reason.13 The size of this kind of e⁄ects does not ap-
pear to be dramatic though, since the responses depicted in Figure 2 are broadly consistent with
those in the mentioned studies taking each policy in isolation (comparison of precise magnitudes
may be misplaced given the subsample sensitivity reported below). In general the dynamics of
13As net taxes respond positively to the federal funds rate, the same will happen with the misestimated shock.
Given that the federal funds rate has a negative impact on GDP, this will amplify the depressing e⁄ects of the
￿scal shock.
16GDP take more time to build up following monetary policy shocks, by comparison with their
￿scal counterparts, but the relative size of the response (one standard deviation shocks are being
compared) is larger.
The assumptions about the ordering of fft vis-a-vis yt and pt do not matter much for the
estimated parameters in the ￿scal equations, nor for the contemporaneous impacts on activity
and in￿ ation (Table B2). The same holds for the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy innovations over time,
but not, of course, for the e⁄ects of monetary policy shocks, in particular, the ensuing decline
in GDP depicted in Figure 2 is delayed by three to four quarters after the shock - the e⁄ect on
impact being positive instead of negative - and becomes overall weaker (similarly to Christiano
et al. (1999)). The data clearly reject a zero semi-elasticity of net taxes to the short-term interest
rate.14 This is estimated at around 0.8-0.9 (and rather precisely) in both schemes, implying that
a 1 p.p. increase in the interest rate leads to a rise in net taxes not far from 1 percent, on impact.
Over time, the automatic positive response of net taxes to a tightening in monetary policy seems
to dominate initially (perhaps reinforced by the reaction to the rise in in￿ ation in line with the
price puzzle), it then weakens and, after about 1 year, the e⁄ect becomes negative as recession
takes hold. This squares with the initial decline in the government de￿cit following a monetary
policy shock that Christiano et al. (1996) report.
I now turn to the response of real GDP to ￿scal policy disturbances. Overall, the picture is
consistent with the conventional Keynesian prior about the e⁄ects of such disturbances on real
activity15 (and also on prices). The ￿gures in Table B2 show a positive and signi￿cant contem-
poraneous e⁄ect of structural innovations in government spending on activity, in particular, a
1 percent shock raises GDP by around 0.2 percent on impact - corresponding to a 1.07 dollar-
for-dollar increase, slightly above the ￿gure estimated in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) (96 to 99
cents). The peak response is reached around the seventh quarter, with a multiplier (the ratio of
the peak response of GDP to the initial shock) of about 1.35. The negative contemporaneous
impact of structural net tax innovations is, in absolute value, much smaller: less than 30 cents
in dollar-for-dollar terms (the estimate is reasonably precise though). The response over time is
on the brink of non-signi￿cance, and the multiplier stands only at 0.40 (the magnitude depicted
in Figure 2 is nevertheless similar to that for spending shocks, because the size of net tax shocks
in dollars is about twice larger). Blanchard and Perotti obtain a stronger negative e⁄ect of net
taxes on output: around 87 cents on impact and a multiplier that varies between 0.8 and 1.3
14In contrast, the parameter a
g;ff is non-signi￿cant, as anticipated. Although this is a bit less marked when
the short-term rate is allowed to react to macroeconomic developments within the quarter, even in this case both
the responses on impact and over time (Figure 2) are very close to zero.
15Such evidence can also be reconciled with neoclassical models. A distinction between macro theories could
only be made by going deeper and studying, for instance, the e⁄ects on output components and transmission
channels. This is not the objective of the work presented here. Note, however, that the de￿nition of variables and
timing of shocks chosen is suited for investigating the e⁄ects of ￿scal policy in a Keynesian framework.
17depending on the speci￿cation. I checked this issue further and, reestimating the system on the
basis of their sample (1960:1-1997:4), got a more pronounced impact, in particular the multiplier
rises to 1.1. The di⁄erence seems thus accounted for by the estimation period, rather than by
the inclusion of the interest rate and prices in the system. In fact, the results obtained have a
marked subsample sensitivity with respect to e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policy to stimulate activity
- as the inspection of the ￿gures in Table B2 already hints. The response of output to ￿scal
disturbances, for both sides of the budget, is markedly stronger in the ￿rst half of the sample. In
the case of net taxes, in particular, it is not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero when the estimation
period starts in 1980. Such a weakening of the e⁄ectiveness in the second half of the sample also
happens in the case of monetary policy.
Romer and Romer (2007) found as well a negative e⁄ect of tax shocks and a large multiplier,
which depends on the precise speci￿cation but is in general well over 2.0. The Romers consid-
ered taxes (not net taxes) and constructed a series for the shocks directly from the legislated
tax changes described in the narrative sources. They then estimated the impact of the shocks
exogenous to economic activity and spending, according policymakers￿statements. The large
impact they get could suggest that their shock measure is comparatively less polluted by en-
dogeneity with countercyclical ￿scal policy, which leads to an underestimation of the respective
e⁄ects. But note that, by construction, the shocks derived in this paper are ortogonal to the
business cycle as well, and also to spending, prices and the funds rate. This should by and large
exclude automatic and endogenous legislated changes in taxes. There are important di⁄erences
between the two methodologies nonetheless, for instance, as far as the magnitude of the shocks
is concerned. In the SVAR approach this magnitude is given by the deviation of the variable
from the average endogenous component over the sample period, while in the Romers￿ s method-
ology it is determined on a case by case basis, from the narrative sources. Such di⁄erences may
account for the observed discrepancy in the results.
The magnitude of the e⁄ects of the ￿scal disturbances on in￿ ation is slightly above 0.1 p.p., in
absolute terms. The responses are barely signi￿cant though, and the dynamic path of the variable
following spending innovations is a bit awkward, going down quickly toward zero and becoming
signi￿cant again at about the ￿fth quarter. As to the plausibility of the point estimates, since
the path of in￿ ation presumably re￿ ects the departure of output from the ￿ exible price level,
one can assess it against standard Phillips curve results. The deviation of the level in￿ ation from
the steady state in p.p. is about one half of the percentage deviation of GDP from trend, which
seems reasonable according to the evidence presented, for instance, in Gordon (1997). Given the
targeting of the federal funds rate, its response to shocks to government budget should derive,
indirectly, from the impacts on activity and in￿ ation. For government expenditure shocks, it is
a very tiny one and actually not signi￿cant.
18The structural disturbances to government expenditure do not enter signi￿cantly the net
tax equation - a ￿nding already reported in Blanchard and Perotti. Switching the order of net
taxes and expenditure, i.e. considering bg;nt 6= 0, leads to a similar conclusion.16 Over time,
innovations to net taxes and purchases of goods and services do not trigger a mutual response,
irrespective of the ordering of the two variables. This ￿nding is con￿rmed by the variance
decompositions (and discussed in more detail below) and is surprising. One would expect a
stronger feedback between these variables, given the presumable tendency by government to
partly ￿nance changes in one of them with changes in the other, which should originate a short-
run response, and the obvious long-run relationship depicted in Figure 1.
When the system is estimated including only a constant, without detrending GDP and the
￿scal variables, the ￿scal policy shocks have a much more persistent e⁄ect on GDP. In contrast
to Figure 1, the responses hardly go back to trend within the 5 years after the shock and, in
addition, the peak and trough impacts become more pronounced (another change is that the
path of in￿ ation following a shock to net taxes becomes positive after about 5 quarters). This
increase in persistence also occurs, but is less evident, for monetary policy. However, as said,
the speci￿cation without detrending may not capture the output gap well, as it does not allow
for the decrease in long-run growth of GDP over recent decades.
6.2 Variance decompositions
Table 1 shows the decomposition of the forecast error variance for the policy variables into the
portion accounted for by each of the three identi￿ed policy shocks and the non-policy shocks
considered jointly.17 The ￿rst interesting point emerging from the table is that own shocks
to the federal funds rate and net taxes explain, respectively, only 1/4 and 1/5 of the long-
run ￿ uctuation in the variables. In other words, the movements in these variables are mostly
endogenous, happening in response to macroeconomic conditions. By contrast, own innovations
to government expenditure explain about 3/4 of the long-run variation.
The overwhelming contribution of the own innovation to the variance decomposition of gov-
ernment expenditure indicates that most movements a⁄ecting this variable pursued policy goals
that cannot be traced back (and hence are exogenous) to macroeconomic conditions. Among
these goals feature, as alluded to in Section 2, national security, expenditure restraint or wage
comparability with the private sector. There is nevertheless a response of this variable to prices
through which most the role of non-policy innovations in the decomposition reported in Table
16The ￿gures corresponding to the ones in Table B2 (full sample) are, respectively, ^ b
g;nt = ￿0:02[^ t = 0:6] and
^ b
g;nt = ￿0:02[^ t = 0:5].
17The latter is equal to the contribution associated with the variances and covariance of w1t and w2t. As
explained in Section 3, these ultimately re￿ ect the variances of the underlying structural disturbances to private
aggregate demand and aggregate supply.
191 is likely to materialize. Net taxes have a strong endogenous content, notably re￿ ecting re-
sponses to the business cycle and prices. The di⁄erence vis-a-vis the behavior of spending hints
that the latter are basically automatic responses. This conclusion is also corroborated by the
fact shown by Romer and Romer (2007) that the legislated tax changes responding to cyclical
developments were infrequent and almost con￿ned to the decade 1965-1975.18 As a whole these
￿ndings underpin the conclusion that the concept of policy reaction function is much less com-
pelling in the case of ￿scal policy than of monetary policy. The strong endogenous content of
the monetary policy instrument has been acknowledged in the literature (see, for instance, Sims
and Zha (1998)): it re￿ ects the conduct of stabilization actions by the Federal Reserve through
the policy rule (when yt and pt are ordered before fft the e⁄ect remains although less markedly
- non-policy shocks account for slightly less than 60 per cent of total variance).
Table 1: Variance decomposition: policy variables
Expenditure Net taxes Federal funds rate
Shocks Policy Non-pol. Policy Non-pol. Policy Non-pol.
eg ent eff eg ent eff eg ent eff
1Q ah. 94.6 0.0 0.9 4.3 2.8 55.9 4.0 37.3 1.1 0.1 91.3 7.9
4Q ah. 92.2 0.1 2.3 5.2 1.1 25.7 4.7 68.5 1.1 0.1 55.6 43.1
12Q ah. 83.8 2.1 2.9 14.5 1.0 19.1 4.8 75.1 0.8 2.3 31.2 65.1
24Q ah. 74.6 2.4 2.3 27.6 1.0 19.3 4.8 74.9 1.3 4.7 24.4 69.6
Notes: Percentage of the variance of the error in forecasting government spending, net taxes and the funds rate accounted
for by the structural policy disturbances (government spending, net taxes and funds rate) and non-policy disturbances.
A second point coming out of the table is the already noted lack of mutual response between
the ￿scal variables: each one never explains more than a residual amount of the variance of
the other. Note that, given the de￿nition of the budget variables adopted here, in which social
bene￿ts are netted out against taxes, this concerns the absence of a short-term response between
revenue and purchases of goods and services that are only part of total budget outlays. In any
case, there seems to be less an important short-term feedback between the two sides of the
budget than usually assumed. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that there is nevertheless a low
frequency co-movement linking net taxes and spending that, by consequence, is not accounted
for by a short-run one. Such long-run relationship must originate in the ￿scal actions toward
correcting budget imbalances but, as mentioned in Section 3, these seem to be follow a non-linear
pattern perhaps related the size of the cumulative imbalance, which causes them to take place
at infrequent intervals. The system does not have a mechanism to capture such an e⁄ect, and
18That the intensity of the discretionary ￿scal response to the business cycle has changed over time implies that
there would be gains in introducing time-variation in the system. In fact, the subsample sensitivity found points
in the same direction.
20so this may translate ultimately into some bias in ￿gures in Table 1 against the contribution
of each budget variable to the variance of its counterpart.19 One way to get an idea about
the size of the bias is to impose a long-run relationship, even if not a fully adequate one, by
assuming cointegration between net taxes and expenditure (instead of extracting the trends).
When this is done, spending (ordered ￿rst) explains about 18 per cent of the variation in taxes in
the long-run and triggers a positive and persistent reaction of this variable. The contribution of
non-policy innovations to that variation remains high, nevertheless, at 60 per cent. The variance
decomposition of spending continues to be dominated by the own innovation - with a share of
85 per cent in the long run.
Table 2 shows the variance decomposition of forecast errors for GDP and in￿ ation. There
is not much to be taken out of these results except that exogenous policy explains a relatively
small part of movements in GDP - about one quarter, considering both policies. In other words,
such interventions are not the primary source of business cycle ￿ uctuations (the same holds for
movements in prices). Monetary policy VARs have come to a similar ￿nding - see Sims and Zha
(1998). On the other hand, it is well known that the ￿gures in the table - referring to exogenous
policy - do not do justice to the stabilizing role of policy when it operates mostly in a systematic
way, be it automatic or discretionary.
Table 2: Variance decomposition: non-policy variables
GDP In￿ ation
Policy Non-pol. Policy Non-pol.
Shocks eg ent eff eg ent eff
1Q ah. 7.5 2.4 0.5 89.6 3.9 0.0 0.0 96.0
4Q ah. 5.9 1.5 5.3 87.3 3.4 1.4 2.2 92.9
12Q ah. 9.6 3.0 11.9 75.5 4.2 3.5 5.9 86.4
24Q ah. 11.9 3.3 12.0 72.8 6.8 4.8 13.4 75.0
Notes: Percentage of the variance of the error in forecasting GDP and in￿ation ac-
counted for by structural policy disturbances (government spending, net taxes and
funds rate) and non-policy disturbances.
7 The role of ￿scal and monetary policies during contractions
In this section, the identi￿ed VAR estimated previously is used to shed some light on the behavior
and e⁄ects of monetary and ￿scal policies during postwar business cycle contractions. Such an
analysis has of course to include systematic policy that appears to be the dominant source of
19Anther issue arising is that some ￿scal actions to cope with protracted de￿cits will be captured by the
estimated ￿scal shocks. To the extent that this category of shocks is approximately unrelated to current economic
developments, the implications should not be dramatic.
21variation in the federal funds rate and net taxes. This is impossible using the standard VAR
tools since they provide a way to evaluate the impact of exogenous policy only. I resort to a
methodology employed by Sims and Zha (1998) and Bernanke et al. (1997) to overcome that
di¢ culty. The basic idea behind it is to compare the historical behavior of the variables of interest
with the implied behavior when the system is simulated under counterfactual assumptions, which
here concern modi￿cations in the policy responses and paths of exogenous policy shocks. I
undertake this exercise for each of the eight business cycle contractions - as given by the NBER
dates - over the sample period 1955:1-2005:4. It is well known that the implementation of such
policy analyses in a VAR context is not without caveats given the issues raised by the Lucas
critique: one can argue that if endogenous policy had been di⁄erent from the historical path,
agents could have reacted di⁄erently. In defense of this approach, one can put forward the
argument of Sims and Zha that it may provide acceptable results if the deviation of policy from
its historical path is not too protracted. The episodes considered lasted on average less than 4
quarters.20 Beyond that issue of a more theoretical nature, another caveat to be made concerns
the reliance on a model with constant coe¢ cients throughout an extended period and on the
identi￿cation assumptions. Analyses like the one carried out here have been pursued by previous
literature using di⁄erent methodologies - a particularly well-known example being Romer and
Romer (1994), who nevertheless do not di⁄erentiate between endogenous and exogenous policies.
Some of the ￿ndings will be assessed against the description provided by the Romers of the
conduct of monetary and ￿scal policies around recessionary episodes.
The detailed methodology of the counterfactual exercises is as follows. For each contraction
and each policy variable, I simulate the system (1) to (5) under two scenarios: (i) absence of the
exogenous component of policy and (ii) absence of the endogenous component of policy. The
simulation period starts at the ￿rst quarter after the peak and ends at the quarter of the trough
(for GDP I also present the results for two quarters afterwards). More precisely, taking gt as
an example, exercise (i) is carried out with the parameters in all equations at their estimated
values and the shocks set to their estimated paths during the simulation period, except for ^ e
g
t
which is set to zero. Exercise (ii) shuts down any systematic reaction of gt so that during the
simulation period the variable in driven only by exogenous shocks. This is done by setting all
parameters in (1) to zero, except for the ￿rst lag of the policy variable at issue which is set to
one. Otherwise the shocks to all variables, including ^ e
g
t, are set to their estimated paths and
the parameters in the remaining equations are at their estimated values. The exogenous and
endogenous components obtain as the di⁄erence between the actual level and the simulated level
20Although it is di¢ cult to assess what «not too protracted» might be in this context, Blanchard (1984)
concluded that it took more than one year for ￿nancial markets to believe the Volcker de￿ ation, and perhaps
more than that in the case of labor markets.
22of the policy variable at the trough. Similarly, the e⁄ect on GDP is measured as the di⁄erence
between the actual level of output gap and the level implied by the simulation.
Table 3 breaks down the actual peak-to-trough change in expenditure, net taxes and the
federal funds rate into the systematic and exogenous components. Note that the change in
each policy variable is not exactly matched by the sum of two components, because there is
an interaction between them (as each policy variable incorporates the own structural shocks in
previous periods) that the simulation exercise by de￿nition does not capture. Nonetheless, in
general, this is not as important as to prevent a reasonable approximation.
Table 3: Decomposition of changes in the policy variables during contractions
Expenditure Net taxes Fed. funds rate
Business (%, cumulative) (%, cumulative) (p.p., cumulative)
cycle actual cf. decomp. actual cf. decomp. actual cf. decomp.
contractions change exog. endog. change exog. endog. change exog. endog.
57:03-58:02 1.2 0.6 0.5 -16.0 -1.6 -14.1 -2.3 1.5 -4.1
60:02-61:01 2.9 3.4 -0.7 -6.9 4.5 -14.3 -1.7 0.5 -2.1
69:04-70:04 -2.5 -1.3 -1.0 -15.8 0.6 -15.6 -3.4 -1.4 -2.0
73:04-75:01 1.8 3.7 -1.8 -18.4 6.0 -28.0 -3.7 -3.9 -0.3
80:01-80:03 -2.5 -2.9 0.5 -8.7 2.0 -11.0 -5.2 -2.6 -2.6
81:03-82:04 1.8 1.0 0.7 -20.5 -0.5 -20.0 -8.3 -1.1 -7.5
90:03-91:01 0.6 0.5 0.0 -8.6 -1.4 -6.5 -1.7 0.1 -1.8
01:01-01:04 1.9 -0.5 2.3 -12.6 0.8 -10.5 -3.5 -2.0 -1.1
Notes: The dates indicate the peak and trough quarters. Actual change in the variable is measured as the
variation peak-to-trough. The components are equal to the di⁄erence, at the trough, between the actual ￿gure
for the policy variable and the simulated ￿gure shutting down the exogenous or the endogenous response,
respectively. The simulation period starts in the ￿rst quarter after the peak.
The ￿rst fact coming out of Table 3 is the consistent pattern of anti-recessionary endogenous
movements in the federal funds rate and net taxes. Nothing comparable happens for government
expenditure whose endogenous variation is not even uniformly countercyclical (i.e. positive).
This reinforces the idea that the endogenous movements in spending are mostly related to
prices and, given the marked di⁄erence between the behavior of the two ￿scal variables, that the
automatic stabilizers are the driving force behind net taxes. As one would expect, the exogenous
components of the change in the policy variables do not follow a de￿ned pattern.
The estimated monetary policy rule is compatible with systematic actions building the back-
bone of the countercyclical behavior of monetary policy throughout recessions. In the 1973-75
and 1980 recessions, however, an important part of the countercyclical movement was captured
by the exogenous component. In other words, the actual loosening was larger than implied by
23the estimated rule. Note that in￿ ation went up substantially during those episodes giving rise,
according to that rule, to a smaller response than the usual one given the sharp contraction in
output (see Figure 1). This ￿ts in with the reading of the Fed￿ s behavior during the two reces-
sions in Romer and Romer (1994), in that, the Fed recognized at an early stage the downturns
in activity but hesitated to take action (in what can be seen as acting according to the rule)
due to concerns about in￿ ation. Only later, in view of the unfavorable output developments,
decided to cut the funds rate more sharply. In the most recent contraction there was almost an
overreaction of the instrument as a whole, given the comparatively mild decline in activity (but
the caveat made about the assumption of constant coe¢ cients throughout the sample period is
in order here)21.
The overall change in net taxes is clearly dominated by the endogenous component, suggest-
ing a high degree of responsiveness to the business cycle. The exogenous component is small,
by comparison. No important tax measures that could be classi￿ed as exogenous were enacted
in the course of the periods considered, with exception of the Reagan tax cuts coinciding with
the 1981-82 recession. Nevertheless, during the ￿rst half of the sample, personal income tax
brackets used to remain unchanged for some time - as it happened in the periods overlapping
with all recessions up to and including 1980 (see Tax Foundation (2007)). This amounted to
a tax increase even without legislation passed, for recessions stretching over two taxable years,
in particular in times of high in￿ ation. It may explain the positive sign and large size of the
exogenous component in the 1973-75 recession.22 The exogenous component of net taxes is also
impacted by the evolution of social transfers. Looking at the growth rate of social transfers in
real and per capita terms, excluding the category most responsive to the business cycle, unem-
ployment insurance, one observes that such rate used to be somewhat higher in the contractions
occurring in the ￿rst half of the sample, and thus contributed to shrink the exogenous compo-
nent (of net taxes) at those times.23 It is worth noting that the large tax cuts of the sixties and
seventies occurred outside contractionary episodes, as dated by the NBER. This is partly due
to the delay in ￿scal policy implementation: the 1975 tax rebate and other measures enacted
by the Nixon administration, though countercyclical, were felt mostly in the second quarter of
21Figures in Table B2 indicate that the coe¢ cients in the monetary rule are larger in the second half of the
sample (this is in line with the evidence in Clarida et al. (2000)). Thus, the use of an «average» rule for the full
sample period may entail a certain underestimation of the endogenous component in recent decades.
22Such movement could be partly captured by the endogenous component, to the extent that it was a systematic
reaction to in￿ ation. Note, however, that this was not a persistent feature throughout the sample.
23As explained in Appendix A, in the calculation of the elasticities I only considered a current response to GDP
for unemployment bene￿ts. Other categories of transfers may have some sensitivity to it. Visual inspection of the
chart with the growth rate of transfers not related to unemployment indicates that this may have been the case
over the last two decades (covering the recessions at the beginning of the 1990s and 2000s), perhaps re￿ ecting
an increased weight of programs to ￿ght poverty. This tends to overstate the exogenous component of transfers
vis-a-vis the endogenous one in the two last contractions.
24the year, that is one quarter after the trough. The 1964 tax cut happened in the middle of an
expansion and, according to the Romers￿reading, it was motivated by concerns about sluggish
growth and incentives.
The size of the movements in government expenditure during contractions have been much
smaller than for the other variables: they averaged 1.5 standard deviations24 against almost 5 in
the case of the funds rate, and almost 6 in the case of net taxes. In this case, it is the exogenous
component that dominates, again suggesting that the countercyclical role is unimportant. That
component captures the buildups in defense spending coinciding with recessionary episodes, but
there is only one such case in the postwar period: the rise in military expenditure during the
Reagan administration (1981-82). Defense outlays also increased much in the wake of the 11/9
which happened toward the end of the 2001 contraction. However, this a⁄ected only the last
quarter of the episode and did not have much in￿ uence on the behavior of spending in the course
of it, as a whole. Variations in the exogenous component of expenditure were larger in absolute
value in the ￿rst half of the sample (without an uniform direction) and this may be related with
the mentioned fact that compensation of employees varied much largely until the beginning of
the 80s. It is di¢ cult, nevertheless, to relate the ￿gures and magnitudes in the tables with
precise wage increases taking place in the periods. There may be other in￿ uences at work and,
as said, part of the variation in real compensation of employees is endogenous - the exogenous
shock is, broadly speaking, the deviation of the actual response to in￿ ation from that average
estimated endogenous response. Such endogenous response encompasses a negative reaction
to current in￿ ation (as calibrated above), given the absence of contemporaneous indexation
and, one would expect, a positive one to lagged in￿ ation. One expects that this will reduce
the endogenous component in periods of rising in￿ ation and the opposite in times of declining
in￿ ation. As Figure 1 shows, two of the recessions considered coincided with such periods: 1973-
75 (rise) and 1981-82 (decline). The mentioned e⁄ect appears to be present in the ￿rst one but
not so clearly in the second.25
24Considering only the positive (i.e. countercyclical) changes.
25The endogenous component of spending in the 1981-82 recession is nonetheless the largest (positive) of all
episodes, with exception of that in the most recent one whose magnitude is di¢ cult to explain.
25Table 4: Impact of ￿scal and monetary policies on output
Business Impact (%, cumulative) of changes in:
cycle Expenditure Net taxes Fed. funds rate
contractions exog. endog. exog. endog. exog. endog.
57:03-58:02
at the trough 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.0 -0.4 0.6
2Q afterwards 0.3 0.2 0.0 1.1 -0.8 1.9
60:02-61:01
at the trough 0.7 -0.1 -0.3 1.0 0.1 0.2
2Q afterwards 0.7 0.0 -0.4 1.1 -0.1 0.9
69:04-70:04
at the trough -0.3 -0.2 0.0 1.1 0.1 0.5
2Q afterwards -0.5 -0.3 0.2 1.5 0.7 1.0
73:04-75:01
at the trough 0.8 -0.4 -0.5 2.1 -0.3 -0.2
2Q afterwards 0.8 -0.4 -0.4 2.8 1.3 0.0
80:01-80:03
at the trough -0.5 0.1 -0.1 0.7 0.2 0.2
2Q afterwards -0.4 -0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.8 1.0
81:03-82:04
at the trough 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.7 -0.3 2.2
2Q afterwards 0.2 0.2 -0.2 2.4 0.3 4.2
90:03-91:01
at the trough 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.1
2Q afterwards -0.4 0.1 0.1 0.8 -0.1 0.8
01:01-01:04
at the trough 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.2
2Q afterwards 0.1 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.9 0.6
Notes: The impact on GDP is equal to the di⁄erence, at the trough and two quarters
afterwards, between the actual GDP level and the simulated level, shutting down the
endogenous policy response. The simulation period starts in the ￿rst quarter after the
peak.
What was the impact on GDP of the outlined pattern of changes in policy variables during
contractions? The ￿gures in Table 4 try to answer that question, presenting the estimated
output gain, both at the trough and two quarters afterwards.26 The second ￿gure will capture
the impact of movements in policy variables occurring before but close to the trough, that might
not be re￿ ected in the ￿rst one, if the reaction of GDP takes time to build up (as it happens
26The latter includes the contribution of changes in policy taking place within the two quarters following the
trough.
26with exogenous monetary policy, as documented above). The automatic stabilizing role of taxes
comes out very clearly from the ￿gures in Table 4: it can be quanti￿ed at around 1 per cent in
terms of output loss avoided at the trough (it stood over 2 per cent in the 1973-75 contractions).
By comparison, the role of systematic monetary policy is somewhat less important at that point
(the 1981-82 contraction builds an exception), but it rises to equal importance two quarters
afterwards. In short, taxes and transfers have contributed more than the monetary policy
instrument to moderate the severity of recessions, and both contribute similarly to the strength
of the recovery at early stages. Government spending has played a minor role as a stabilizing tool
since mid-￿fties. In most recessions, the di⁄erence in the impact of the endogenous component
on GDP at trough and following 2 quarters is larger in the case of the funds rate than in the case
of net taxes, which indicates that the full-impact of monetary policy on GDP is comparatively
delayed.
8 Conclusions
In this paper an SVAR system was estimated, identifying monetary and ￿scal policy distur-
bances, and counterfactual simulations were carried out in order to gauge the impacts of sys-
tematic versus non-systematic policies. The following main conclusions were reached:
￿ The consideration of ￿scal and monetary policies in conjunction does not change, in broad
terms, the pattern of responses of activity to policy shocks, documented by previous studies
taking each policy in isolation. Nevertheless, a weaker impact of net taxes on activity was
found which can be mainly ascribed to subsample sensitivity. This is a marked feature
of the results for ￿scal policy that warrants further exploration. Results also point to a
relatively unimportant short-term feedback between net taxes and purchases of goods and
services.
￿ Variance decompositions show that the federal funds rate and net taxes have a large
endogenous content while government expenditure is mostly driven by own shocks. The
behavior of the federal funds rate re￿ ects the operation of the monetary policy rule. The
di⁄erence in the behavior of net taxes and spending is basically accounted for by the
automatic stabilizers built in the tax and transfer system. In general, the concept of policy
reaction function seems to ￿t in much better with the way monetary policy is conducted,
in comparison to ￿scal policy.
￿ The main forces playing a stabilizing role during the contractions in activity since the
￿fties were discretionary monetary policy and automatic ￿scal policy. The latter has the
27largest impact in terms of reduction in output foregone at the trough of recessions, but
they contribute similarly in the ensuing quarters to narrow the output gap.
9 Appendices
A Detailed computation of the contemporaneous ￿scal elastici-
ties
A.1 Personal income taxes
The derivation of theoretical expressions for the elasticity to GDP, prices and the interest rate
of personal income taxes (which also applies with small changes to the elasticity of social con-
tributions to activity and prices) is a bit more involved than for the remaining types of taxes.
I assume that the personal income tax base reacts to prices, as nominal wages adjust to it to
some degree, and also to the short-term interest rate, as the latter a⁄ects asset income earned
by households. Each individual in the population (assumed to be equal to the labor force)
earns labour income and/or asset income. Let the real personal income tax revenue be given by
T = [t((W(L;P) + A(FF))(W(L;P) + A(FF))L(Y )]=P where t(:) is the average tax rate, W
the nominal wage, A individual income on assets, P prices, L employment, Y GDP and FF the
federal funds rate.1 The nominal tax base per worker is B = W + A. I assume that the income
on assets reacts contemporaneously only to the federal funds rate because, as regards personal
interest income, the underlying stock is mostly determined by past economic conditions, while
dividends are also linked to past pro￿ts.






















= aW;LaL;Y (at;W + sW) + aL;Y ,
where aW;L the elasticity of wages to employment, aL;Y the elasticity of employment to output,
at;W is the elasticity of the (average) tax rate to the wage and sW = W
W+A is the share of labour
income in total income. Note that the expression for aPIT;Y appearing in OECD￿ s work (in
Giorno et al. (1995)) corresponds to the one above but with sW is equal to 1, as they consider
1I assumed in the computation of the elasticities of purchases of goods and services that the wage bill in the
government sector does not respond to macroeconomic developments (see below). One would have to consider a
separate elasticity for government￿ s wage bill, as a component of the tax base, to be fully consistent. I have not
done so, in order to simplify matters.
28labor income only.














￿ 1=4 = aW;P(at;W + sW) ￿ 1=4, (A2)
in which aW;P is the elasticity of wages to prices and the changes in prices are measured at
annual rates.














= aA;FF(at;A + sA), (A3)
where aA;FF is the semi-elasticity of asset income to the interest rate and sA = A
W+A is the share
of asset income in total income.
The expressions above are based on the partial derivatives of the real income tax revenue
with respect to each one of the variables of interest which assume, by de￿nition, that the other
variables in the expressions remain constant. This assumption does not raise problems because
such partial e⁄ect is exactly what the contemporaneous coe¢ cients in the structural equations
are supposed to measure.2 I now examine the assumptions underlying the computation of the
elasticities of the average tax rate to the wage and asset income per worker, at;W and at;A (the
remaining parameters are estimated by means of econometric regressions - see below). It is clear
that these elasticities will not be constant throughout the wage and asset income distribution.
Nevertheless, one needs a summary measure in order to compute the ￿gures using the expressions
given above. The OECD approach copes with this, for the labor income case, by computing
the average and the marginal tax rates of a representative family with certain characteristics, at
di⁄erent points of the wage distribution. Afterwards a weighted average of each of the two tax
rates is computed on the basis of the weight of wage income at each point in total. The ratio
of the two weighted averages yields the summary elasticity measure. This procedure is carried
out for several years so to incorporate modi￿cations in the tax code.
In order to describe precisely how to extend this procedure to the case of labor and asset
income, and to illustrate the di¢ culties to compute at;A, I now denote with ij the magnitudes
above evaluated at the arbitrary cohort (Wi;Aj) of the wage and individual asset income dis-
tribution, and without ij the corresponding aggregate magnitudes. Assuming that the elasticity
to the base at a given cohort (Wi;Aj) is the same irrespective of whether there is a marginal
2That is, the derivative of real direct taxes with respect to Y assumes that FF and P are unchanged when Y
varies. Of course, when GDP changes, the federal funds rate and prices may change as well, but this is captured
by other contemporaneous coe¢ cients than a
nt;y
0 .




























where the ￿ij￿ s are the weights computed as the share of wage and asset income associated





Bij equal to Wi + Aj and Lij equal to the number of individuals associated with the cohort
(Wi;Aj)). The computation of precise ￿gures for at;W and at;A would thus require information
about the distribution of (W;A) and the corresponding values for a
ij
t;B, for several years, which
is not available.
Nevertheless, the OECD ￿gure should provide a good basis to compute at;W. Note that, if
a
ij
t;B was constant for a given wage level Wi (i.e. it did not depend upon j because all individuals




t;B would hold, with the weights
 i
W given by the share of wage income associated with the cohort Wi in total, according to
the marginal distribution of W. This relationship should provide a reasonable approximation
in practice, as there is a higher concentration of individuals (at lower cohorts) for individual
asset income than for wages. Further, as labor income represents the bulk of personal income,
the elasticities calculated considering only labor income as the tax base (as in OECD) should
not be too far from ai
t;B. By contrast, such elasticities and information about the the marginal
distribution of W would not be suitable for the calibration of at;A.




t;B + 1 (as they refer to the elasticity of the tax
revenue not of the tax rate) and vary considerably over time, ranging from 1:3 to 3:9 over the last
three decades. The computation of aggregate ￿gures for the shares of labor and asset income -
sW and sA - does not raise problems since they are just the shares of wage and asset income for
the economy as a whole4 (see Appendix C for the series used). The ￿gure for sW ranges from
0:75 to 0:85 over the period 1955:1-2005:4.
The remaining parameters in (A1) and (A2) are computed through econometric regressions,
following the method in Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Speci￿cally, ^ aW;L = 0:33[^ t = 4:0] and
^ aW;P = 0:09[^ t = 1:6] are the lag 0 coe¢ cients of a regression of log change in wages on the ￿rst
lead and lags 0 to 4 of log change in employment and change in annualized in￿ ation (sample
1955:1-2005:4).5 Note that I take as the price variable in￿ ation measured at annual rates.
3This may not happen for every (W
i;A
j). For instance, if there are tax deductions applying only to labor
income, say the ￿rst $X dollars of employment income are exempt from tax, then for wage levels below $X the
















5One could raise the issue of simultaneity in relation to the regressions used to compute some of the parameters
in (A1) and analogous expressions. I checked the results of corresponding regressions excluding the leads and using
30Likewise ^ aL;Y =0:68[^ t = 12:1] is the lag 0 coe¢ cient of a regression of log change in employment
on the ￿rst lead and lags 0 to 4 of log change in GDP. The average ￿gures for ^ aPIT;Y and ^ aPIT;P
are equal, respectively, to 1:1 and ￿0:09.
A.2 Social security contributions
The responses of social contributions are based on the corresponding expression for the real
revenue T = [t((W(L;P))W(L;P)L(Y )]=P, where t(:) is the average tax rate and the other


























￿ 1=4 = aW;P(1 + at;W) ￿ 1=4. (A6)
The average ￿gures for ^ aSC;Y and ^ aSC;P are equal, respectively, to 0:88 and ￿0:17.
A.3 Corporate income taxes
The tax base of the corporate income tax, corporate pro￿ts, is supposed to react to GDP and
prices. I assume that the tax is proportional (note further that the corporate income tax is
recorded on an accrual basis by NIPAs, which should approximately undo the lag between the
earning of pro￿ts and the payment of the tax). Therefore, real corporate income tax revenue is
given by T = tPR(Y;P)=P, where t is the tax rate and PR are corporate pro￿ts. The elasticities








￿ 1 = aPR;P ￿ 1=4, (A8)
where aPR;Y and aPR;P are the elasticities of pro￿ts to GDP and prices. These parameters were
computed as the coe¢ cients for lag 0 of a regression of the ￿rst di⁄erences of log pro￿ts on
the ￿rst lead and lags 0 to 4 of the change in log GDP and the change in annualized in￿ ation.
This yielded ^ aPR;Y = 4:6[^ t = 10:4] and ^ aPR;P = 1:8[^ t = 4:7]. Accordingly, ^ aCIT;Y = 4:6 and
^ aCIT;P = 1:6.
lags of the right-hand side variables as instruments and they di⁄ered by little.
31A.4 Indirect taxes
The tax base of indirect taxes is assumed to be nominal GDP and the tax to be proportional.
The revenue of indirect taxes in real terms is given by T = tY , where t is the tax rate, implying
a 1.0 elasticity to activity and a 0.0 elasticity to prices.
A.5 Transfers to households
Transfers to households are expected to only to activity mainly through unemployment insurance
payments. Such payments have represented on average only about 3 percent of social bene￿ts
over the last decade, though at the beginning of the sample they represented a bit more than
that, averaging 5 to10 percent. Let real transfers to households be equal to T = (￿ T +UB(Y ))=P,
where ￿ T is the component of transfers that does not react to activity and UB(Y ) is the amount
of unemployment bene￿ts. The elasticity of transfers to households to GDP is approximately













where sUB is the share of unemployment bene￿ts in total transfers, au;Y is the unit variation of
the unemployment rate in response to a 1 percent increase in GDP and u is the unemployment
rate. I set au;Y equal to -0.24 from Blanchard (1989). The average ￿gure for ^ aTH;Y is -0.26.
As to the contemporaneous response to prices, many categories of social bene￿ts such as old-
age and unemployment bene￿ts are not indexed within the quarter, and thus a -1.0 elasticity for
real outlays seems adequate. By contrast payments related to health programs are likely to be
sensitive to change in prices. I assume for them a zero elasticity in real terms. These payments
were rather small in the ￿fties and sixties, but they have become one of the most important
components of social bene￿ts, weighting currently over 40 percent. The elasticity of transfers to
households to prices is based on an expression analogous to the one above, but picking out the




= (sHB ￿ 1)=4, (A10)
where sHB is the share of health bene￿ts in total. The average ￿gure for ^ aTH;P is -0.19.
A.6 Purchases of goods and services
Purchases of goods and services are composed of compensation of government employees and
intermediate consumption and investment (one does not have to consider here the consumption
of ￿xed capital since it is excluded from the measure of purchases used - see Appendix C). The
32share of compensation of employees in total was slightly below 50 per cent in the initial years of
the sample, but it has represented a bit more than half of the total since mid-sixties. In general
one expects intermediate consumption and investment spending to be determined by the nominal
amount budgeted, implying a -1.0 elasticity of real purchases to contemporaneous in￿ ation. Also
the wage updating process in the government sector is such that price developments typically
a⁄ect wages with some lag. There may be indexation but with a certain delay, for instance, pay
adjustments for the blue-collar occupations in the Federal government (Federal Wage System)
are indexed to lagged changes in private sector wages, according to the areas where the services
are located (see O⁄ice for Personnel Management (2002)). The semi-elasticity of real purchases
of goods and services to annualized changes in prices is assumed to be constant:
^ aG;P = ￿1=4. (A11)
B Further estimation results
B.1 Reduced-form results
Table B1: Correlations between the reduced-form
residuals
g nt ff y p
g 1.00
nt 0.11 1.00
ff -0.03 0.33 1.00
y 0.26 0.48 0.17 1.00
p -0.01 0.13 0.16 -0.05 1.00
Notes: Correlation coe¢ cients. Residuals of OLS esti-
mation of the reduced-form system with government ex-
penditure, net taxes, federal funds rate, GDP and in￿ a-
tion. Equations include 4 lags of each variable. Sample:
1955:1-2005:4.
33B.2 Structural results
Table B2: Contemporaneous coe¢ cients
Scheme ay;ff = ap;ff = 0 Scheme aff;y = aff;p = 0
Sample 1955:1-2005:4 Sample 1955:1-2005:4
g nt ff y p eg g nt ff y p eg
g 1 0 -0.16 0 (-0.25) g 1 0 0.01 0 (-0.25)
[-1.3] [0.0]
nt 0 1 0.93 (2.19) (0.26) -0.08 nt 0 1 0.80 (2.19) (0.26) -0.08
[3.9] [-0.5] [3.5] [-0.5]
ff 0 0 1 0.26 0.15 ff 0 0 1 0 0
[3.2] [2.5]
y 0.20 -0.05 0 1 0 y 0.18 -0.05 0.23 1 0
[4.0] [-2.2] [3.5] [-1.8] [2.8]
p 0.16 0.01 0 0 1 p 0.14 0.01 0.18 0 1
[2.6] [0.5] [2.3] [0.4] [1.8]
Subsample 1955:1-1979:4 Subsample 1955:1-1979:4
g nt ff y p eg g nt ff y p eg
g 1 0 -0.04 0 (-0.25) g 1 0 0.13 0 (-0.25)
[-0.1] [0.5]
nt 0 1 0.62 (2.19) (0.32) 0.04 nt 0 1 0.47 (2.19) (0.32) 0.07
[1.4] [0.3] [1.1] [0.3]
ff 0 0 1 0.11 0.05 ff 0 0 1 0 0
[1.4] [0.8]
y 0.36 -0.17 0 1 0 y 0.34 -0.17 0.28 1 0
[3.7] [-2.5] [3.3] [-2.2] [1.3]
p 0.06 0.04 0 0 1 p 0.04 0.06 0.06 0 1
[0.8] [1.1] [0.5] [1.0] [0.3]
Subsample 1980:1-2005:4 Subsample 1980:1-2005:4
g nt ff y p eg g nt ff y p eg
g 1 0 -0.09 0 (-0.25) g 1 0 0.01 0 (-0.25)
[-0.7] [0.1]
nt 0 1 1.01 (2.20) (0.21) -0.19 nt 0 1 0.91 (2.20) (0.21) -0.18
[3.2] [-0.8] [2.7] [-0.7]
ff 0 0 1 0.51 0.13 ff 0 0 1 0 0
[3.4] [1.3]
y 0.09 -0.02 0 1 0 y 0.09 -0.02 0.25 1 0
[1.6] [-0.7] [1.6] [0.7] [3.1]
p 0.13 0.04 0 0 1 p 0.13 0.01 0.19 0 1
[1.0] [1.7] [1.5] [0.3] [1.6]
Notes: Calibrated values, sample period averages (in parentheses), and estimates of the contemporaneous
coe¢ cients in equations (1) to (5). Government expenditure ordered before taxes. Estimates on the left-
hand side panels are by maximum likelihood and on the right hand side panels by instrumental variables.
t-ratios in square brackets.
34C Variable de￿nition and data sources
Fiscal data are from NIPAs Table 3.1. Government Current Receipts and Expenditures; data on the components
of government consumption, including the breakdown defense/non-defense, are from NIPAs Table 3.10.5 Gov-
ernment Consumption Expenditures and General Government Gross Output; data on social bene￿ts including
unemployment and health-related bene￿ts are from NIPAs Table 3.12. Government social bene￿ts (annual data,
the share for the year as a whole was assumed for the quarter).
Taxes = Personal current taxes + Taxes on production and imports + Taxes on corporate income + Contributions
for government social insurance + Capital transfer receipts (the latter item is composed mostly by gift and
inheritance taxes).
Transfers = Subsidies + Government social bene￿ts to persons + capital transfers paid - Current transfer receipts
(from business and persons).
Net taxes = Taxes - Transfers.
Purchases of goods and services = Government consumption - Consumption of ￿xed capital
1 + Government
investment.
Gross domestic product is from NIPAs Table 1.1.5. Gross Domestic Product.
Gross domestic product de￿ ator is from NIPAs Table 1.1.4. Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product.
Federal funds rate (quarterly averages of daily data) is from the FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis).
Population is from NIPAs Table 2.1. Personal income and its Disposition.
Federal debt held by the public (Section 3.1) is from the FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Labor income and personal asset income (Section 3.2 and Appendix A) are equal, respectively, to wages and salaries
and to the sum of interest income, dividend income and rental income, all from NIPAs Table 2.1. Personal income
and its Disposition. Proprietors￿income was not considered, since there is no obvious way to allocate it between
labor and asset income.
Employment in the manufacturing and Average hourly earnings in the manufacturing (Appendix A) are from the
FRED database (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis).
Corporate pro￿ts (Appendix A) is from NIPAs Table 1.10. Gross domestic income, by type of income (the
inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments were undone).
1Consumption of ￿xed capital is excluded on two grounds. Firstly, there are no shocks to this variable which is
fully determined by the existing capital stock and depreciation rules. Secondly, from the viewpoint of the impact
on aggregate demand, it is the cost of capital goods at time of acquisition (already recorded in government
investment) that matters and not at time of consumption.
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